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It would be easy to dismiss Slavoj Žižek‟s contributions to The Monstrosity of Christ as 
coming too late, 45 years too late to be precise.
1
 For what Žižek defends, namely the 
Hegelian reading of Christianity, was itself already developed in all of its radicality by 
Thomas J. J. Altizer, the most colorful proponent of the so-called “God is dead” theology, a 
short-lived theological movement which flowered in the second part of the 1960s. The 
Hegelian reading of Christianity which was proposed by Altizer (in his 1966 book The 
Gospel of Christian Atheism) and which is now being re-endorsed by Žižek in The 
Monstrosity of Christ entails that it was God Himself who died when Christ died on the cross 
on Calvary and that this death marks the transition from God as transcendent Father to the 
Holy Spirit as the community of believers, understood by Žižek in terms of a collective of 
revolutionary individuals.
2
 This basic scheme, adopted from Hegel‟s Lectures on the 
Philosophy of Religion, has informed the Christological reflections offered by Žižek in the 
past ten years,
3
 but it has been rejected by a majority of theologians as being heterodox and 
therefore unacceptable. Moreover, “God is dead” theology – albeit somewhat fashionable for 
a couple of years and sparking many heated debates in the media and among theologians – 
was never fully able to become mainstream. Such comes as little surprise, given the fact that 
it is actually a theological dead-end: it seems to offer merely a theological justification for the 
end of theology as God-talk. Moreover, Žižek‟s dependency on Hegel‟s basic scheme seems 
to suggest that one is forced to an all-or-nothing choice when it comes to accepting or 
rejecting his Christological reflections: either one shares this basic scheme and is able to 
follow Žižek in his ruminations on Christ or one does not share the basic scheme and can 
only reject Žižek‟s interpretation of the Christ-event. However, the aim of the present article 
is to show that in approaching Žižek, even if one does not follow him in his Hegelianism, one 
can nevertheless enter into a theological dialogue with him. As Žižek‟s contributions to The 
Monstrosity of Christ are very dense and touch upon a wide variety of issues, in what follows 
I will focus on one element, namely his interpretation of the Biblical character of Job and its 
relation to the issue of atheism. To start our discussion from within the context of 
contemporary theology, I will begin by taking a look into the reading of the Book of Job 
which has been offered by French philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1913–2005), one of the 
founding fathers of contemporary hermeneutical theology. 
 
Paul Ricoeur: The Faith of Job 
 
Paul Ricoeur‟s most extensive discussion of the Biblical character of Job can be found in his 
early work The Symbolism of Evil (1967; French original in 1960).
4
 In the first part of this 
book, Ricoeur discusses three “primary symbols” of evil: defilement, sin and guilt. Here, the 
figure of Job is introduced as witnessing to a crisis, the crisis caused by what Ricoeur 
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designates as “the hypersubjective reality of sin,” the fact that “my sin [is conceived to be] 
within the absolute sight (regard) of God” (84). As noted by Ricoeur, this “being seen by 
God” was initially a positive thing: it was a source of self-awareness, the person who is seen 
by God becomes a Self precisely by being seen by God (84–85). In the case of Job, however, 
the sight of God has become “an inimical seeing that pursues him” (85). God‟s sight, Ricoeur 
continues, “suddenly reveals itself as the seeing of the hidden God who delivers man up to 
unjust suffering” (85–86). The seeing of God, which used to be experienced as salutary, has 
now become unbearable, an “inquisitorial eye which makes man guilty” (319). 
The second part of The Symbolism of Evil deals with four “„myths‟ of the beginning and 
the end” (“the „ritual‟ vision of the world,” “the „tragic‟ vision of existence,” “the 
„eschatological‟ vision of history” and the vision that expects “salvation through 
knowledge”). In this context, further reference is made to the figure of Job in the fifth and 
final chapter of the book (titled “The Cycle of the Myths”), in a section dealing with “The 
Reaffirmation of the Tragic” (310–326). According to Ricoeur, the God of the Bible is to be 
understood as “an ethical God” and the Hebrew Scriptures basically offer “a moral vision of 
the world”. This entails that “History is a tribunal, pleasure and pains are retribution, God 
himself is a judge. At the same time, the whole of human experience assumes a penal 
character” (314). In Ricoeur‟s view, the Book of Job signals the breakdown of this 
understanding of history. Here, the “„ethicization‟ of man and God” collides at its limits. The 
case of Job shows that there is evil in excess of that which can be accounted for by 
retribution. Retribution is not able to explain all of the unhappiness and suffering in the world 
(314). It should be noted, as Ricoeur does so himself, that this problem of unjust suffering – 
that is, suffering that cannot be justified in terms of “he that mischief hatches, mischief 
catches” – is inherent to the ethicization present in the Hebrew Scriptures. Indeed, it is only 
when God is conceived as “ethical” that the problem of unjust suffering can come into 
existence. Outside the context of such an ethical vision, suffering can still be a problem (cf. 
Buddhism), but it cannot be a moral problem, an issue of justice. For, what happens in the 
case of Job is that a tension comes into being between God as Creator, who may be excused 
for moving in a mysterious way, and God as Lawgiver, who may reasonably be expected to 
comply with his own law. 
It is here of course that theodicy begins, the attempt to justify God in light of unjust 
suffering. This is the way taken by Job‟s pious friends. They do their best to close the gap 
which opened between the Creator-God and the ethical God, “mobili[zing] forgotten sins, 
unknown sins, ancestral sins, the sins of the people, in order to restore the equation of 
suffering and punishment” (315). Job, in contrast, refuses this option and it is here that 
Ricoeur sees a tragic vision re-emerging in the heart of the Biblical ethicization of God. Job 
rediscovers “the tragic God” – that is, “the inscrutable God of terror” (319). In this way, he 
moves beyond the ethical vision of man and God, world and history, and enters “a new 
dimension of faith, the dimension of unverifiable faith” (319). Moreover, what also makes the 
Book of Job a return of tragedy is its outcome: Job falls silent and God answers out of the 
whirlwind, but what He says is in no way an answer to Job‟s predicament. All God does is 
“show him Behemoth and Leviathan, the hippopotamus and the crocodile, vestiges of the 
chaos that has been overcome, representing a brutality dominated and measured by the 
creative act” (321). In this way, Ricoeur continues, God “gives [Job] to understand that all is 
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order, measure, and beauty – inscrutable order, measure beyond measure, terrible beauty” and 
He points to “an order beyond order, a totality full of meaning, within which the individual 
must lay down his recrimination” (321). When Ricoeur returns to the symbolism of evil in his 
later book The Conflict of Interpretations (1974; French original in 1969), this renunciation is 
interpreted in terms of love: “The only thing shown to [Job] is the grandeur of the whole, 
without the finite viewpoint of his own desire receiving a meaning directly from it. A path is 
thus opened … I renounce my viewpoint; I love the whole as it is.5 In this regard, Richard 
Kearney, following his master Ricoeur, sees the Book of Job ending with “a contemplative 
wisdom of love:” at the end of the story, Kearney writes, Job has learned to love God for 
nothing.
6
 
The figure of Job also plays an important role in Ricoeur‟s 1966 Bampton Lectures, titled 
“Religion, Atheism, and Faith.”7 In these lectures, a new direction and contemporary 
meaning of Job is mapped out. During his Bampton Lectures, Ricoeur defended “the 
religious significance of atheism,” stating “that atheism does not exhaust itself in the negation 
and destruction of religion” but that it rather “clears the ground for a new faith, a faith for a 
post-religious age” (59/440). This entails that atheism, and it is the atheism of Freud and 
Nietzsche Ricoeur has in mind here, takes the intermediary position between religion and 
faith, it is what links them together and what separates them. Or, as Ricoeur puts it: atheism 
destroys religion and liberates us for a faith beyond religion (60/441). The religion that is to 
be destroyed is summarised here by Ricoeur in terms of “two fundamental activities,” “the 
fear of punishment and the desire for protection” – i.e., “accusation” and “consolation.” This 
entails that the God that has to pass away is the “moral God who [is] the principle and 
foundation for an ethics of prohibition and condemnation” (68/447) and “the providential 
God” – that is, God both as “the ultimate source of accusation” and as “the ultimate source of 
protection” (82/455). According to Ricoeur, this “death” of the ethical God, enables a 
transition to new kind of faith, a “tragic faith beyond any assurance or protection,” and it is 
precisely Job who is put forward by Ricoeur as the model for this new faith (82/455–456, 87–
88/460). This post-religious faith is described by Ricoeur as follows: 
 
It would be a faith that wanders in the darkness, in a “new night of understanding” – 
to use the language of the mystics – before a God who has not the attributes of 
“Providence.” This God does not protect me but delivers me up to the dangers of a 
life worthy of being called human. Is not this God the Crucified, the dying God, the 
God whose weakness alone may help me? The new night of the understanding is a 
night for our desire as much as for our fear, a night for our longing for a protective 
father. Beyond this night, and only beyond it, will be recovered the true meaning of 
the God of consolation, the God of the Resurrection, the Pantocrator of Byzantine 
and Romanesque imagery. (88/460) 
 
This suggests that for Ricoeur atheism can play an instrumental role on the way to a purified 
faith. In his view, atheism should have the same effect for us today as the crisis of the moral 
God that befell Job had for him. In this regard it is important to note that Ricoeur emphasises 
that Job, despite his severe criticism of God, always remains in relation with God.
8
 His 
criticisms are precisely formulated as complaints addressed at God. As Job passed through a 
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dark “night of understanding” and rediscovered God, but a God beyond the law of retribution, 
the modern believer should pass through the darkness of atheism to recover God at the other 
side of the night. Or, as Ricoeur put it at the end of his Bampton Lectures: idols have to die in 
order to be recovered as symbols (98/467). 
 
Slavoj Žižek: From Job to the Recovery of Christian Atheism 
 
Let us now bring forward Slavoj Žižek to join the conversation. The figure of Job appears in 
Žižek‟s oeuvre on a regular basis. This happens for the first time in the early Enjoy Your 
Symptom! (1992).
9
 Here, Žižek first endorses René Girard‟s basic claim concerning the Book 
of Job as put forward in the latter‟s book on Job.10 Girard dismisses the whole set-up in the 
Prologue – with Satan seducing God into putting Job to the test to check whether he will still 
be righteous when all is against him – as a mythification which hides the subversive core of 
the book, namely that Job is a sacrificial victim, the scapegoat of his community, subjected to 
religiously sanctioned violence. The revolutionary character of the Book of Job, Žižek states, 
while following Girard, consists in the fact that we encounter here a victim that speaks, that 
refuses to undergo his victimization in silence, but protests and rebels instead. Moreover, the 
subversive power of the Book of Job consists in the fact that the perspective of the sacrificial 
order (represented by Job‟s “pious” friends) and the perspective of the victim are found next 
to each other. As a result, the “official” perspective is deconstructed by the perspective of Job 
while the presence of the perspective of the perpetrators guarantees the truth of the 
perspective of the victim (56). Although Žižek endorses Girard‟s basic claim concerning Job, 
he is also critical of him. He reproaches him for turning Job into merely a forerunner of 
Christ, “the true paradigm of a victim who speaks out and subjectivizes himself” (57). 
However, Žižek states, insofar as Christ‟s death on the cross is “a gesture of love,” something 
is lost in the transition from Job to Christ, namely “the anxiety-provoking abyss of the 
Other‟s [i.e., God‟s] inconsistency” (57). In Christ, Žižek adds, “God himself changes into a 
lover and reaches back toward man – thereby concealing the abyss of Otherness that no 
sacrifice could appease, i.e., with which no relationship of exchange is possible” (58). This 
suggests that at the time Enjoy Your Symptom! was written in the early 1990s Žižek was still 
rather critical of Christ‟s gesture and seemed to prefer Job over Christ. 
Almost ten years later, Žižek‟s next reference to the Book of Job appears in On Belief 
(2001). Here Žižek‟s earlier criticism that Christ is a step back in comparison with Job is not 
repeated and the claim will not reappear in future work. In On Belief, Žižek mentions Job in 
passing when he writes that what happens in Christianity is that God himself as Christ finds 
himself in the situation earlier experienced by Job, the situation of being God-forsaken. When 
Christ dies on the cross, abandoned by his Father, the gap that separates human beings from 
God, the gap earlier experienced by Job, is reflected back into God himself.
11
 
The next year, in the Foreword to the second edition of his For They Know Not What They 
Do (2002),
12
 Žižek devotes a couple of pages to the figure of Job. Žižek begins his discussion 
of Job by repeating the link, already made the year before in On Belief, between Job and 
Christ. He states that Job is the key to understand the Christ-event (Job prefigures Christ) (li), 
while adding that both are linked by the meaninglessness of their suffering. What 
distinguishes Job from Christ is of course that when Christ suffers, it is God who is himself 
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the victim and is abandoned by God (liii). This time, Žižek also focuses on the dénouement of 
the Book of Job. He dismisses God‟s intervention at the end of the book as “a pure argument 
of authority grounded in a breathtaking display of power” and as “a kind of cheap Hollywood 
horror show with lots of special effects.” God, Žižek notes, behaves here like somebody who 
is “caught in [a] moment of impotence – weakness, at least – and tries to escape his 
predicament by empty boasting” (li). Žižek further stresses that “the true greatness of Job,” 
which, in his view, consists in his persistent refusal to give in to the “ideology” of his 
theological friends who want to give some meaning to his suffering (li–lii). Žižek even claims 
Job as the first true materialist, someone who is able to accept the contingency of the 
vicissitudes of life without having to search for a hidden design behind them (lii). But if Job, 
as Žižek claims, staunchly refuses to accept that his suffering can have any meaning and 
resolutely rejects any secret design hidden behind it all, why does he fall silent? Why does he 
even repent?
13
 
This question does not receive an answer in For They Know Not What They Do, but it does 
the next year, in The Puppet and the Dwarf (2003).
14
 In The Puppet and the Dwarf, Žižek 
first repeats his reflections on Job already printed in the Foreword to the second edition of 
For They Know No What They Do. In this repetition (124–126), he further inserts the idea 
that Job is confronted with the impenetrability of God (124). After the material that was 
repeated, Žižek raises the question which remained unanswered the year before: why Job‟s 
silence – especially when the discrepancy between Job‟s question (“why do I suffer?”) and 
God‟s answer (power display, boasting) is so obvious? To this question, Žižek now 
formulates the following answer: 
 
What, then, if this was what Job perceived, and what kept him silent: he remained 
silent neither because he was crushed by God‟s overwhelming presence, nor because 
he wanted thereby to indicate his continuous resistance, that is, the fact that God 
avoided answering Job‟s question, but because in a gesture of silent solidarity, he 
perceived the divine impotence. God is neither just nor unjust, simply impotent. 
What Job suddenly understood, was that it was not him, but God Himself, who was 
actually on trial in Job‟s calamities, and He failed the test miserably. Even more 
pointedly, I am tempted to risk a radical anachronistic reading: Job foresaw God‟s 
own future suffering – “Today it‟s me, tomorrow it will be your own son, and there 
will be no one to intercede for him. What you see in me now is the prefiguration of 
your own Passion!” (126–127) 
 
More recently, Žižek has elaborated once more on Job at the occasion of the paper he 
contributed to St. Paul among the Philosophers (2009)
15
, a paper which was almost verbatim 
reprinted in The Monstrosity of Christ (43–55, 56–61 and 87–89), or vice-versa (in what 
follows we refer to The Monstrosity of Christ). Falling back on the remarks on the outcome 
of the Book of Job by the English Catholic writer Chesterton (1874–1936) in his 
“Introduction to the Book of Job,” Žižek notes that what we get there is that God answers 
Job‟s questions about the design of the world by showing that the world is in reality even 
more incomprehensible than Job already thought it was (53).
16
 Žižek even suggests that the 
end of the Book of Job presents us a God who himself does not understand it all, “a God 
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overwhelmed by his own creation” (244) and maybe a God who is, as Žižek had already 
suggested in On Belief, even a mystery for himself: “the enigma OF God” is also “the enigma 
IN God Himself”, “God is an enigma also IN AND FOR HIMSELF.”17 The figure of Job, 
Žižek further adds in The Monstrosity of Christ, shows us how to respond to catastrophes that 
have befallen us or may befall us in the future: by resisting any attempt to give them 
meaning, by refusing to integrate them into a larger whole (53). This also entails that we 
should get rid of “the standard transcendent figure of God as a secret Master who knows the 
meaning of what appears to us to be a meaningless catastrophe” (54). Clinging to such a God, 
Žižek contends, is “obscene” in light of the atrocities that have happened and are still going 
on around the world (54–55). 
In The Monstrosity of Christ, Žižek also once more links Job to Christ. He repeats his view 
that in the crucified Jesus, God occupies the place of Job: the gap that separated Job from 
God is transposed into God himself. To emphasize the far-reaching and revolutionary 
character this has in Žižek‟s view, we can first refer to his comments on an unfinished 
drawing of the crucified Christ by Michelangelo (reproduced on the cover of The Monstrosity 
of Christ). Žižek draws attention to a number of “unsettling details indicat[ing] an underlying 
attitude of angry rebellion, of defiance” and in particular to the stretched finger of Christ‟s 
right hand, a gesture which Žižek interprets (following Quintilian) as a gesture of devilish 
rebellion (277–278). This can be linked to a fragment from Chesterton‟s Orthodoxy, quoted 
by Žižek, in which the former states that only Christianity has a “god who has himself been in 
revolt”, a god who has shared the atheists” isolation, a “God [who] seemed for an instant to 
be an atheist.”18 Thus, what happens when Christ is on the cross, is that God the Son rebels 
against God the Father. Like Job before, the Son staunchly refuses to accept that his suffering 
can have any meaning and resolutely rejects any secret design hidden behind it. Therefore, 
Žižek concludes (following Chesterton), “Christianity is „terribly revolutionary‟.”19 He 
explains this further as follows: 
 
In the standard form of atheism, God dies for men who stop believing in him; in 
Christianity, God dies for himself … Christianity … enacts the reflexive reversal of 
atheist doubt into God himself. In his “Father, why have you forsaken me?”, Christ 
himself commits what is for a Christian the ultimate sin: he wavers in his Faith. 
While in all other religions, there are people who do not believe in God, only in 
Christianity does God not believe in himself. (48–49) 
 
 
Žižek vs. Ricoeur: Concluding Remarks 
 
1. It is obvious that Ricoeur‟s Job and Žižek‟s Job stand for two diametrically opposed 
responses to the phenomenon of (unjust) suffering. Ricoeur‟s Job opts for resignation and for 
the hope that his suffering, which appears as senseless from his limited perspective, will 
somehow turn out to fit in a larger picture (this hope is what Job‟s “unverifiable faith” seems 
to amount to in Ricoeur‟s view); Žižek‟s Job, in contrast, opts for resistance and staunchly 
refuses to accept that his suffering could have any meaning at all. This shows that Žižek 
rejects Ricoeur‟s interpretation of the outcome of the Book of Job, according to which Job is 
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convinced – and even repents for daring to suppose that the world does not make sense20– 
because God makes him aware of “the possibility of […] an unassignable design, a design 
which is God‟s secret.”21 According to Žižek, no such design can ever justify unjust suffering. 
2. Ricoeur and Žižek also give completely different answers to the question of what the 
case of Job teaches us about God. According to Ricoeur, Job learns that God is impenetrable 
and inscrutable. His motives and the design inspiring his actions are hidden and beyond 
human comprehension. In other words, Ricoeur emphasizes the enigma of God. Žižek, in 
contrast, stresses the enigma in God and underscores that Job discovers God‟s secret, namely 
that He is actually impotent and imperfect. Remarkably, there is nevertheless a link between 
Ricoeur and Žižek. Ricoeur‟s view implies that Job has learned to love God for nothing. The 
love for God also appears in Žižek, who defends that it is precisely God‟s imperfection that 
makes it possible for God to become an object of love. In The Monstrosity of Christ, Žižek 
explains this as follows: “Love is always love for the other insofar as he is lacking – we love 
the other because of his limitation. The radical conclusion from this is that if God is to be 
loved, he must be imperfect, inconsistent in himself” (39). This suggests that, if we follow 
Žižek in this understanding of love, the true religious attitude does not consist in worshipping 
God qua perfect Being, but in loving God qua impotent and imperfect. This also entails that 
the Ricoeurian answer to the predicament of Job, loving God for nothing, is only possible 
when God is not an omnipotent actor, not the one who is running the show, and when there is 
no hidden design behind what befalls us. God is not “a transcendent caretaker who guarantees 
the happy outcome of our acts” (55). In other words, we should accept the contingency of 
everything that happens. 
3. Furthermore, while Žižek explicitly links the figure of Job with the figure of Christ, this 
link is absent in Ricoeur‟s discussions of Job. It is possible, however, to introduce this link in 
the work of Ricoeur as well. The starting point for doing so could well perhaps be Ricoeur‟s 
reference to the figure of the Suffering Servant of the Lord from Second Isaiah, who has 
traditionally been understood as a prefiguration of Christ and in whom Ricoeur sees the 
opposition between suffering as retribution and unjust suffering surpassed in a third form of 
suffering, suffering as expiation for the sins of others.
22
 Yet, interpreting Christ‟s death in 
terms of this kind of expiation seems to entangle us in a “perverse” reading of Christianity, 
according to which God is “a perverse subject” playing games with his son and humankind or 
a cruel, merciless and jealous creature in need of a bloody sacrifice to satisfy his offended 
honor.
23
 According to Žižek, a non-perverse reading of the Crucifixion entails that one should 
understand it, not as a higher form of suffering, but precisely as the moment God is himself 
thrown in the abysmal experience of being subjected to unjust suffering. The Crucifixion is, 
as Žižek puts it in The Monstrosity of Christ, the moment when Christ “confronts the Father 
with the meaninglessness of it all” (57). This shows that, next to the ethical God of the 
Hebrew Scriptures and the tragic God which re-emerges in the Book of Job, there is a third 
“face” of God, namely the suffering God and, Žižek explains, it is in the suffering God that 
the tension between the two other “faces” of God is overcome (52). 
4. Finally, Ricoeur and Žižek also conceive the link between the case of Job and the issue 
of atheism in differing ways. For Ricoeur, atheism remains something which is instrumental: 
it occasions a purification of the faith, but it remains something which originates from outside 
the realm of faith and something which, in the end, needs to be overcome – after the dark 
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night of atheism, a new daybreak of faith has to follow. According to Žižek, atheism is an 
intrinsic part of Christianity because Christianity is, as Chesterton stated, the religion in 
which God himself becomes an atheist. It is of course obvious that Žižek goes beyond 
Chesterton. For Chesterton, God was an atheist only for an instant on the cross. For Žižek, in 
contrast, Christ‟s experience of God-forsakenness on the cross is the moment God qua 
transcendent Father actually dies. This view of Žižek is of course a result of his Hegelianism. 
But, next to Žižek‟s faithfulness to Hegel‟s basic scheme, there is no justification for this 
transition from God the Son sharing the atheist‟s experience on the Cross to the death of God 
the Father – unless one limits the Father of Christ to the God qua “secret Master who knows 
the meaning of what appears to us to be a meaningless catastrophe” and the “transcendent 
caretaker who guarantees the happy outcome of our acts” who is discredited by the case of 
Job. Thus, even if we follow Chesterton and Žižek in considering atheism to be an integral 
part of Christianity, it does not automatically follow that we should also follow Žižek in his 
plea for a Hegelian reading of Christianity and his defence of Altizer‟s God-is-dead theology. 
But even if we don‟t do this, it remains possible to stick to Žižek‟s basic insight, to be found 
in On Belief, that “When I, a human being, experience myself as cut off from God, at that very 
moment of utmost abjection, I am absolutely close to God, since I find myself in the position 
of the abandoned Christ.”24 Thus, to conclude: The Monstrosity of Christ is a great 
opportunity for its readers to (re)discover the suffering and weak God at the heart of 
Christianity. Missing this opportunity because one rejects Žižek for his endorsement of 
Hegelian-style God-is-dead theology would therefore be a pity. 
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